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Abstract 
 
The period from 1850 to 1914 saw unprecedented scientific and technological advances and 
unprecedented, multinational conferences attempting to control the use in war of new, and more 
destructive, technology. Yet World War I made a mockery of the spirit and sometimes the letter 
of these conferences. As Europeans asked themselves in the wake of the death and destruction 
wrought by World War I, how could an era of such promise – of such noble, rational declarations 
of peace, of astounding scientific and technological progress, of glittering international 
exhibitions – end with a descent into madness?  Combining research on pre-World War I arms 
control, science and technology, science fiction, and ethical movements, I attempt to show how 
the dissonant character of the era helps to explain the relative failure to control military-
technological innovations, and, thus, the failure to prevent the future war prophesied by the new 
military-science fiction writers. !
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On August 12, 1898, Tsar Nicholas II perplexed 
the powers of Europe with a proposal “[to seek], 
by means of international discussion, the most 
effective means of ensuring to all peoples the 
benefits of a real and lasting peace, and above 
all of limiting the progressive development of 
existing armaments.”1 The conference was to be 
“a happy presage for the century about to open.” 
Thus was born the Hague Peace Conferences of 
1899 and 1907. Yet before a third conference 
could be held, World War I made a mockery of 
the spirit, and sometimes the letter, of the Hague 
Conferences. As Europeans asked themselves in 
the wake of the death and destruction wrought 
by World War I, how could an era of such 
promise – of such noble, rational declarations of 
peace, of astounding scientific and technological 
progress, of glittering international exhibitions – 
end with a descent into Hell? Although many 
historians have addressed this question, an 
examination of the intersection of technology 
and the ethics of war and peace can show how 
the dissonant character of the era helps to 
explain the relative failure to control military-
technological innovations, and, thus, the failure 
to prevent the future war prophesized by the 
new military-science fiction writers. 
 
 
Arms Limitation Treaties before World 
War I 
 
The first modern agreement to prohibit the use 
of certain weapons in war was the St. Petersburg 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Instructions to the American Delegates to the 
Hague Conferences and their Official Reports, ed. 
James Brown Scott (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1916): 1-2. 
Declaration of 1868.2 Signed by seventeen 
European nations, the Declaration formally 
codified the custom of abstaining from weapons 
that cause unnecessary suffering. The signers of 
the Declaration claimed to have “fixed the 
technical limits at which the necessities of war 
ought to yield to the requirements of 
humanity.”3 After positing that “the progress of 
civilization should…alleviate the calamities of 
war” and that “arms which uselessly aggravate 
the sufferings of disabled men, or render their 
death inevitable” exceed the legitimate object of 
war, the Declaration banned explosive or 
fulminating bullets under 400 grams. Such 
bullets explode or fragment on impact, causing 
horrible and difficult-to-treat wounds. The 
Russian military had invented such bullets a 
year earlier but, knowing these bullets would 
contravene the customary law of war, declined 
to use them.4 Not wanting any other country to 
take advantage of this technology, the Russian 
government proposed an international ban, the 
first in a series of international disarmament 
conferences that the tsarist government would 
convene. 
The most well-known and important 
attempt at arms limitation was the 1899 Hague 
Conference on Peace and Disarmament called 
by Tsar Nicholas II. As in 1868, the initial 
impetus was to restrict a newly developed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Richard Dean Burns, The Evolution of Arms 
Control: from Antiquity to the Nuclear Age (Santa 
Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2009): 113. -!Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, 
of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes 
Weight, Saint Petersburg, 29 Nov. 1868, accessed 
from the Avalon Project, 
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu>. 
4 Dietrich Schindler and Ji!í Toman, The Laws of 
Armed Conflicts (Dordrecht: Martinus Nihjoff, 
1988): 102. 
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weapon Russia did not want used - this time 
expensive rapid-fire artillery recently acquired 
by Austria-Hungary and Germany - though a 
sincere desire to limit the arms race likely 
mingled with economic interests.5 The 
conference included the United States, Brazil, 
and several Asian countries in addition to 
European states. However, most delegations 
were uninterested in arms control, opposing 
both sweeping restrictions on armaments and 
narrow prohibitions on new rifles, new 
explosives, submarines, and other innovations.6 
In the end, only weapons little or never yet used 
were restricted. The delegations agreed to a five-
year ban on “the launching of projectiles and 
explosives from balloons, or by other new 
methods of a similar nature.”7 Dum-dum bullets, 
which are notched, semi-jacketed bullets that 
flatten on impact, were banned as inhumane, 
although Britain and the US did not ratify the 
agreement. Britain claimed it needed dum-dum 
bullets to stop “fanatical” natives in colonial 
uprisings and the US would use the same 
argument in the Philippines.8 The Hague 
Conference also prohibited asphyxiating gasses 
launched by projectile. Again, neither Britain 
not the US ratified the proposal, with the US 
arguing poison gas might prove more humane 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Scott Andrew Keefer, "Building the Palace of 
Peace: The Hague Conference of 1899 and Arms 
Control in the Progressive Era,” Journal of the 
History of International Law 8.1 (2006): 7-8. 
6 Keefer, 10-2. 
7 Burns, 67; Hague Declaration [No. IV, 1] to 
Prohibit for the Term of Five Years the Launching of 
Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, and Other 
Methods of a Similar Nature, 29 July 1899, accessed 
from the Avalon Project, 
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu>. 
8 Burns, 105. 
than explosives.9 The attempts at peaceful 
settlement of hostilities met with slightly more 
success, producing most importantly the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
The second Hague Peace Conference 
was generally a failure. At the prodding of US 
peace groups and state legislatures, President 
Theodore Roosevelt called for another 
international conference on disarmament, which 
Russia officially convened in 1907.10  However, 
at that time Russia was rebuilding its military, 
devastated by the war with Japan, and was more 
interested in arbitration than arms limitations. 
Although the ban on aerial bombing was 
rescinded, the delegations did agree to one arms 
limitation measure. After China complained of 
the number of its ships sunk on collisions with 
mines from the Russo-Japanese War, the 
conference forbade naval mines and torpedoes 
that did not automatically deactivate.11 WWI 
precluded a planned third conference. 
 
 
Change in the 19th Century: New 
Weapons, New Ideas 
 
The period that saw the first pan-European 
disarmament conferences also witnessed the 
greatest military-technological advancements 
that had yet occurred. Between 1800 and 1914 
machine guns replaced muskets, trenches 
replaced firing lines, and telegraphs replaced 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Keefer, 13-4. 
10 Calvin DeArmond Davis, “Theodore Roosevelt 
and the Pious Fund,” The United States and the 
Second Hague Peace Conference: American 
Diplomacy and International Organization 1899-
1914 (Durham: Duke UP, 1975): 51-72. 
11 Keefer, 36. 
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runners.12 In the first half of the century, most 
technological improvements were based in craft 
and driven by trial-and-error, more an influence 
on than influenced by science. By the second 
half of the century, however, technology 
increasingly developed from the practical 
application of theoretical science.  Innovations 
in steel, explosives, and gun sights came not 
from tinkering, but from research in metallurgy, 
chemistry, and optics on an industrial scale.13 
What had been known as the “art of war” 
became “military science.”14 Realizing that 
technological and industrial capacity had 
become the measure of military prowess, 
governments sought to encourage this capacity 
through increased military-technical training and 
incentives for industrial firms that manufactured 
weapons.15 Factories and technical colleges were 
themselves often organized on military 
models.16 The continuous management of 
civilian activities for the benefit of war-making 
blurred the previously sharp distinction between 
war and peace and planted the seeds of a 
military-industrial complex.17 For writers like 
the socialist William Morris, the metaphor of the 
“war-machine” encapsulated this new reality in 
which warfare and technology marched arm-in-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Barton C. Hacker, “Engineering a New Order: 
Military Institutions, Technical Education, and the 
Rise of the Industrial State,” Technology and Culture 
34.1 (Jan. 1993): 3. 
13 Maurice Pearton, The Knowledgeable State: 
Diplomacy, War and Technology since 1830 
(London: Burnett, 1982): 38. 
14 Hacker, 2. 
15 Pearton, 38. 
16 Hacker, 14-17. 
17 Pearton, 12. 
arm, heartlessly and relentlessly.18 Even 
ostensibly civilian technologies such as 
telegraphs and railroads transformed war as 
surely as did new weaponry, allowing for the 
coordination of ever-larger armies. The 
unprecedented pace of technological 
advancement was one of the two main reasons 
for the proliferation of treaties on the rules of 
war from the mid-19th century until World War 
I.19 Before the signatures had dried, the new 
treaties became obsolete. 
The other, complementary reason for the 
rash of ineffective peace conferences was the 
existence of two opposing movements: the 
peace movement, along with other 
internationalists and humanitarians; and a looser 
group of militarists, nationalists, and 
imperialists, who clamored for war and 
aggressive national armament programs.20 The 
period from the Franco-Prussian War in 1871 
and the Great War in 1914 saw no major 
conflicts on the European continent; despite or 
because of this, public and governmental 
interest in war and peace reached great heights. 
The core of the peace movement had always 
been unconventional religious sects such as 
Quakers, but it received support from diverse 
groups. It included both free-market capitalists, 
particularly in Britain, who lauded international 
commerce as the bulwark of peace for making 
war too unprofitable, and socialists like Morris, 
who condemned capitalism for breeding profit-
driven wars. The peace movement also !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Herbert L. Sussman, Victorians and the Machine: 
The Literary Response to Technology (Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 1968): 127. 
19 Michael Howard, “Temperamenta Belli: Can War 
Be Controlled?" Restraints on War, 9. 
20 Best, “Restraints on War by Land Before 1945,” 
23. 
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benefited from an emerging sense of European 
unity, which fed the international regulation of 
new technologies like telegraphs, the explosion 
of international expositions, and scientific and 
athletic congresses.21 The movement for war, 
ubiquitous throughout human history, found 
new strength in imperialism, nationalism, 
anarchism, and the “cult” of Napoleon 
Bonaparte, although even these factors may not 
seem sufficient to explain the stridency and 
broad base of the movement.22 The appearance 
of a popular press amplified this public debate, 
but, as one might expect, it leaned toward 
xenophobia and nationalism and was probably 
more a force for war than for peace.23 In fact, 
newspapers were often outlets for national 
bloodlust and vindictiveness, eagerly relaying 
reports on bombardments of enemy civilians 
sent across the globe by telegraph.24 
Parallel to the growth of scientific and 
technical innovations and competing views on 
peace was the development of another print 
medium that reflected and influenced the 
public’s ideas about war: military fiction and, in 
particular, militaristic science fiction. Stories of 
world destruction wrought by terrible new 
inventions overlapped with other popular fin-de-
siècle genres including conventional invasion, 
natural disaster, and political terrorism 
literature.25 Just as society was torn between !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Donald Cameron Watt, “Restraints on War in the 
Air Before 1945,” Restraints on War, 59. 
22 Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare (New York: 
Columbia UP, 1980): 136. 
23 Best, Humanity in Warfare, 138. 
24 Best, “Restraints on War by Land Before 1945,” 
30. 
25 Laurence Davies, “’The Evils of a Long Peace,’” 
Fights of Fancy: Armed Conflict in Science Fiction 
and Fantasy, ed. George Slusser and Eric S. Rabkin  
(Athens, GA: Georgia UP, 1993): 64. 
peace and war, so too was it torn between belief 
in a bright future of scientific, material, and 
moral progress and in a dark future of moral, 
ecological, and political degradation. It is hard 
to analyze the effect writers such as H.G. Wells 
and George Griffith had on the popular attitude 
toward war and weaponry. On the one hand, 
their lurid tales of devastating future wars and 
future weapons gave readers a taste of the 
horrors that might await humanity if it did not 
turn from its current path. On the other hand, 
even those writers who did not explicitly call for 
war glorified the miraculous technology and 
perverse grandeur of a future war. At the risk of 
stepping into the arcane realm of literary 
criticism, it can be argued that science fiction, 
like virtually all popular representations of war, 
did more to stimulate a thirst for blood by 
portraying war as a vicarious adventure, a 
“carnival of destruction” in the words of one of 
Griffith’s heroes, than to encourage appeals for 
peace by warning of war’s ever-increasing 
destructiveness.26 
 
 
Scientific & Technological Dimensions 
of the Debate Over War 
 
European civilization had long considered peace 
the natural state of humanity, with war a 
temporary and regrettable, if inevitable or 
frequent, deviation. Modern political and 
military theorists like Carl von Clausewitz may 
have succeeded in rationalizing war and 
therefore making it more palatable, but it was 
not preferable.27 This underwent a remarkable !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 George Griffith, The Angel of the Revolution: a 
Tale of the Coming Terror (London: Tower, 1893). 
27 Best, Humanity in Warfare, 129. 
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change in some quarters during the 19th century 
with the proliferation of ideologies exalting war 
over peace. 
 Advocates for war as the natural and 
necessary human condition received a huge 
boost in 1859 with publication of Charles 
Darwin’s On the Origins of Species. To the 
social Darwinists, life was a struggle of each 
against all and war the most perfect form of 
natural selection, purging humanity of the unfit. 
An 1898 journal article provides the sentiment: 
“civilisation is making it much too easy to 
live…A wiser humanitarianism would make it 
easy for the lower quality of life to die…We 
have let our brutality die too much.”28 Others, 
Darwin among them, cautioned that war could 
have the reverse effect of natural selection 
because the most fit in society, courageous 
young men, are the most likely to die.29 
 Technology meshed easily into 
distortions of evolutionary theory, where it 
became both the cause and the consequence of 
biological progress. First, commentators across 
the spectrum had proposed that technology was 
the driver of human evolution. In the words of 
the Victorian novelist Samuel Butler, who was 
himself highly ambivalent about the interplay of 
evolution and technology, “[machines] are to be 
regarded as the mode of development by which 
human organism is most especially advancing, 
and every fresh invention is to be considered as 
an additional member of the resources of the 
human body.”30 Second, technology could be the 
indicator of human progress. The anthropologist 
General Augustus Henry Pitt-Rivers, seeking a 
classification system for his collection of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Quoted in Davies, 62. 
29 Pearton, 98. 
30 Quoted in Sussman, 149. 
primitive weapons, suggested that tools 
themselves progress from the simple to the 
complex, following Herbert Spencer’s 
evolutionary principle. 31 The tools a nation 
created located it on linear path of development, 
regardless of that civilization’s time or place. 
Thus, advanced weaponry, scientific and 
technological achievement, and the resulting 
success in war, commerce, and colonial 
acquisitions could all be pointed to as proof of a 
nation’s natural superiority.32 The states that 
dominated others were by definition the most fit, 
making their domination scientifically justified. 
 Social Darwinism could, on occasion, 
take more peaceful forms. Pyotr Kropotkin, the 
Russian evolutionary theorist and anarcho-
communist, argued that cooperation, not 
competition, was the engine of human progress. 
In Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, he wrote, 
“the animal species, in which individual struggle 
has been reduced to its narrowest limits, and the 
practice of mutual aid has attained the greatest 
development, are invariably the most numerous, 
the most prosperous, and the most open to 
further progress...The unsociable species, on the 
contrary, are doomed to decay.”33 “One single 
war,” he continued, “—we all know—may be 
productive of more evil, immediate and 
subsequent, than hundreds of years of the 
unchecked action of the mutual-aid principle 
may be productive of good.” 
 Other advocates for war focused on its 
psychological and social benefits, rather than the 
biological. It was a common opinion that war !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 George Basalla, The Evolution of Technology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988): 17-20. 
32 Pearton, 97-8. 
33 Petr Alekseevich Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor 
of Evolution (New York: McClure, Philips & Co., 
1902): 223, 225. 
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turned boys into men. For example, a columnist 
in the Manchester Sunday Chronicle wrote in 
1898, “the risk of war seems to me an excellent 
stimulant to a nation; it keeps the national fibre 
well-strung and its men manly…[T]he war risk 
is a wholesome antidote to the enervating 
influence of the gold craze, and the art 
worship.”34 Yet others desired a great war to 
sweep away a societal disease, be it materialism, 
capitalism, feminism, or any other “evil.” The 
naturalist British W.H. Hudson, sick of society’s 
“caste feeling” and “detestable partisanship,” 
wrote on the eve of World War I, “still I hope to 
live on to see the flame of war brighten in this 
peace-rotten land. It will look very beautiful to 
many watchers and have a wonderful purifying 
effect.”35 A longing for war could be found 
among the left as well as the right. 
 Like other literary prophets of future 
catastrophes, science fiction writers made good 
use of this scenario, devising new weapons that 
could both destroy and save the world. 
Regardless of whether H.G. Wells himself 
wished for war, his stories display a fascination 
with it and suggest that permanent peace could 
come only after a great war.36 Like the era itself, 
one could be anti-war and pro-war at the same 
time. For example, in his 1914 novella The 
World Set Free, scientists discover a radioactive 
element named Carolinum and use it to make 
atomic bombs (this novella was the first use of 
the term). After a war with these weapons 
devastates the belligerents, a council takes 
permanent control of all the world’s Carolinum, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Quoted in Davies, 61. 
35 Quoted in Davies, 61-2. 
36 Arthur Campbell Turner, “Armed Conflict in the 
Science Fiction of H.G. Wells,” Fights of Fancy, 71. 
and an age of peace and prosperity ensues.37  
 The war-to-end-all-wars plot is even 
better illustrated by another prolific socialist 
science fiction writer, the British author and 
explorer George Griffith. His very popular 1893 
story The Angel of the Revolution: A Tale of the 
Coming Terror features impressive descriptions 
of heavier-than-air “air-ships,” as well as 
perhaps the first air-to-surface missile. It tells 
the story of a Jewish anarchist named Natas 
(Satan spelled backward) who invents an air-
ship and leads an army of flying rebels against 
the Tsar and a host of other enemies. After many 
lavishly described aerial battles in which 
millions die, the rebels succeed in bringing the 
world under the benevolent dictatorship of the 
Anglo-Saxon Federation, which disarms all 
states, leaving only its fleet of air-ships to 
prevent any transgressions. Although the angel 
of the title explicitly refers to the story’s 
heroine, it also renders the story’s air-ships and 
war-balloons avenging angels punishing 
humanity for its sins. As British and Federation 
war-balloons decimate the Ottoman troops, the 
divine power of the weapons is clear. “They had 
never met enemies like these before, and brave 
as lions and yet simple as children, they looked 
upon them as something more than human, and 
with one accord they flung away their weapons 
and raised their hands in supplication to the 
sky.” 38 The final sentence of the novel 
proclaims the ultimate virtue of this “coming 
terror”: “The last battle has been fought and 
won, and so there is peace on Earth at last!” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 H.G. Wells, The World Set Free (New York: E.P. 
Dutton, 1914). 
 
38 Griffith, The Angel of the Revolution. In an 
unpleasant irony, the first targets of aerial bombing 
were Arab villagers in the Italo-Turkish War. 
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Great bloodshed, if lamentable, would be 
necessary to usher in a golden age. Only the 
weapons of the future, perhaps even of the near 
future, could clear away the ancien regime and 
enforce the new order. 
 
 
Restraints on Weaponry 
 
Even those more moderate voices who agreed 
that war was a unavoidable evil that ought to be 
mitigated as far as possible, such as most 
delegates to the Hague Conferences, differed on 
the means of mitigation, perhaps especially so 
when it came to banning particular weapons.  
What criteria should be used?  What makes a 
weapon inhumane?  Just as today, the 
conflicting influences of politics, security, and 
ever-changing technology made these very 
difficult questions,. The British scholar of 
international law in war T. J. Lawrence 
summarized the traditional approach to 
evaluating new weapons in a 1910 edition of his 
The Principles of International Law: 
“sometimes the ground of objection was their 
newness, sometimes their secrecy, and 
sometimes the vastness or cruelty of their 
destructive force.  In one age the cross-bow was 
anathematized, in another the arquebus, in a 
third the bayonet. There was a long controversy 
about red-hot shot till the invention of rifled 
cannon rendered it obsolete.”39  One could add 
to this Louis XV’s desire that the supposedly 
rediscovered Greek fire remain a secret, despite 
its potential use in the Seven Year’s War, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
39 Thomas Joseph Lawrence, The Principles of 
International Law, (Boston: D.C. Heath & Co., 
1910): 543-7. 
many other examples.40  But these were one-off 
events not representative of an era in which the 
mutual embrace of science and technology 
produced new and potentially transformative 
weapons at an exponential rate. 
 Thus, to Lawrence, the 1868 St. 
Petersburg Declaration brought to the debate 
sorely missing rationality according to which the 
only criterion for illegality was the creation of 
unnecessary suffering.  
 
“The attempts which have been made to 
forbid the introduction of new inventions 
into warfare, or prevent the use of 
instruments that cause destruction on a 
large scale, are doomed to failure. Man 
always has improved his weapons, and 
always will as long as he has need for 
them at all...Suffering there must be, as 
long as there is war. But unnecessary 
suffering ought to be, and can be, 
abolished.”41  
Perhaps he would not have been so optimistic 
had he witnessed the deluge of unnecessary 
suffering that was WWI. 
 Military officers, who comprised a large 
portion of the Hague delegations, hated 
prohibiting entire classes of weapons.42 While 
their real motive may have been to keep all 
means of destruction available for use in 
warfare, they often defended new weapons by 
claiming such innovations were more, not less, 
humane. A common, effective, and universally 
applicable argument could be called the ethics 
of technical efficiency: better weapons meant 
shorter wars.  The Commander-in-Chief of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Burns, 63. 
41 Lawrence, 547. 
42 Burns, 156. 
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British Army put it thus at the first Hague 
Conference: 
 
Restrictions on scientific inventions 
deprive a nation of the advantages which 
accrue from its scientific men and from the 
productive capacity of its manufacturing 
establishments. 
It can be proved to the hilt that scientific 
production of engines of destruction had 
tended 
(a) to make nations hesitate before going 
to war; 
(b) to produce the percentages of losses in 
war; 
(c) to shorten the lengths of campaigns, 
and thus to reduce to a minimum the 
sufferings endured by the inhabitants.43 
 
 Others took the officers’ argument to its logical 
conclusion. In a letter to a friend, Alfred Nobel, 
echoing the science fiction writers, declared, “I 
wish I could produce a substance or invent a 
machine of such frightful efficiency for 
wholesale destruction that wars should thereby 
become altogether impossible.”44 Perhaps he 
would have welcomed atomic bombs. 
 
 
Armament Economics 
 
According to the Polish Jewish banker Ivan 
Bloch, Nobel’s wish had already come true.  
The railroad financier wrote a monumental, six-
volume analysis of a future European war, 
released in Britain in an abridged version in 
1899 under the title Is War Now Impossible?  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Watt, 60-1. 
44 Quoted in Burns, 203. 
Bloch argued that war among the European 
powers had become obsolete.  First, the 
firepower of new technology would push armies 
to entrenchment, making decisive victories in 
battle impossible.45  Second, states would try to 
overcome the stalemate by putting millions of 
men in arms.  Third, hostilities would settle into 
a war of economic attrition, leading to “the 
bankruptcy of nations and the break-up of the 
whole social organization.” “War has become a 
tribunal which by the very perfection of its own 
processes and the costliness of its methods can 
no longer render a decision of any kind.” H.G. 
Wells seemed to agree.  His 1903 story The 
Land Ironclads opens with a war correspondent 
asking a young lieutenant, “And this is war?”  
“No,” the lieutenant replies, “it’s Bloch.”46 It 
may have been Bloch’s work that inspired 
Nicholas II to convene the first Hague 
Conference.47 The 1898 Russian circular was 
quite explicit on the economic value of 
disarmament, stating, “hundreds of millions are 
spent in acquiring terrible engines of 
destruction, which though today regarded as the 
last word of science are destined tomorrow to 
lose all value in consequence of some fresh 
discovery in the same field. National culture, 
economic progress, and the production of wealth 
are either paralyzed or perverted in their 
development.”48 
 Peace activists and social reformers 
embraced the argument that even in peacetime 
armaments are an unbearable burden on society, 
robbing the nation of money for the public !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (New York, NY: 
Basic, 1999): 10. 
46 H.G. Wells, “The Land Ironclads,” Strand 
Magazine v. 26 (Jul.-Dec. 1903): 751. 
47 Ferguson, 9-10. 
48 Scott, 2. 
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good.49 Furthermore, the rate of expenditures 
was certain to accelerate continuously. A 1905 
publication by the Cobden Club, a group named 
in honor of peace activist, free-trade supporter, 
and Parliament member Richard Cobden, 
describes the vicious circle of military 
expenditures. “The greater the aggregate force 
of men or ships, the more numerous are the 
intellects directed to the use and manufacture of 
such articles, and the more certain it is that 
inventions will multiply, and the shorter become 
the intervals at which changes become 
necessary.”50 Of course, this claim, too, had a 
pro-war counterpoint, which argued that arms 
manufacturing could offset cyclical recessions 
and that military training instilled discipline that 
benefitted society and employers.51 
 In 1905 views such as the Cobden 
Club’s were strong enough to elect the Liberal 
Party to office on a platform of reducing 
spending on armaments. The party tried to put 
arms limitation in which Russia had little 
interest this time around on the agenda of the 
second Hague Conference, and offered to reduce 
the construction of British warships.52 However, 
Germany, Britain’s main rival at sea, refused to 
negotiate any limitations meant to give Britain 
permanent naval superiority. Absent an 
agreement with Germany, domestic politics 
made it impossible to reduce the number of 
warships planned, if it ever had been politically !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Andre T. Sidorowicz, "The British Government, 
the Hague Peace Conference of 1907, and the 
Armaments Question, Arms Limitation and 
Disarmament: Restraints on War, 1899-1939, ed. B. 
J. C. McKercher (Westport: Praeger, 1992): 2. 
50 George J. Shaw-Lefevre et al., The Burden of 
Armaments: a Plea for Retrenchment (London: 
1905):163-4. 
51 Pearton, 110-1. 
52 Sidorowitz, 2-7. 
feasible.53 
 Of course, herein lies the trouble with 
arms control. Even when an arms issue remains 
outside politics, narrow defense interests derail 
negotiations. For every state that might better its 
position through arms limitations, another state 
would suffer a strategic disadvantage.54 To 
Baroness Bertha von Suttner, a well-known 
peace activist who attended the first Hague 
Conference, having military men negotiate 
disarmament was like asking cobblers to 
“deliberate on how men could give up wearing 
footgear.”55 We have been struggling with the 
same problem ever since. 
Conclusion 
 
The 19th century witnessed unprecedented 
technological progress, the enduring linkage of 
science and technology, the birth of science 
fiction, and the seeds of a military-industrial 
complex. These advances paralleled and 
influenced changes in public opinion on war, 
which manifested itself in two groups, a 
movement for war and a movement for peace. 
These were not distinct groups. They both drew 
on theories of evolution, technological progress, 
economics, and ethics. They even merged in 
those authors and authorities who desired war as 
a means to permanent peace or moral cleansing. 
Viewed in this context, the proliferation of high-
minded disarmament treaties and their failure to 
prevent the atrocities of WWI may be a little 
more intelligible. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Sidorowitz, 13. 
54 Keefer, 12. 
55 Keefer, 15.!
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